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The endowment effect is the tendency to, seemingly irrationally, immediately value a possessed item 
more than the opportunity to acquire the identical item when one does not already possess it.  
Although endowment effects are reported in chimpanzees (Brosnan, Jones, Lambeth, Mareno, 
Richardson, & Shapiro, 2007) and capuchin monkeys (Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2008), 
both species share social traits with humans that make convergence as likely an evolutionary 
mechanism as homology. Orangutans (Pongo spp.) provide a unique insight into the evolution of the 
endowment effect, along with other apparently irrational behaviors, because their less frequent social 
interactions and relatively more solitary social organization distinguishes them from the more 
gregarious apes, allowing a test of evolutionary homology. In the present study, we used pairs of both 
food and non-food objects, as in an earlier test on chimpanzees (Brosnan et al., 2007). We established 
the  apes’  preferences  in  forced-choice tasks, then tested whether they showed an endowment effect in 
an exchange task, in which subjects were given one of the objects, followed by the option to 
exchange it for the other. Here, we report the first evidence of the endowment effect in a relatively 
less social primate, the orangutan. This indicates that this behavior may have evolved as a homology 
within the primates, rather than being due to convergent social pressures. These findings provide 
stronger evidence for the hypothesis that at least one bias, the endowment effect, may be common in 
primates and, potentially, other species.  
 
 Humans often exhibit behaviors that seem irrational. For reasons not well 
understood, we succumb to various cognitive and behavioral biases, some of which 
may reflect evolved adaptations that are not maximized in all environments, and 
may lead to seemingly irrational outcomes in less common contexts. One of these, 
the endowment effect, describes the tendency in humans to value a possessed item 
– even at the instant of acquisition – more than the opportunity to acquire the same 
thing when it is not yet possessed (Franciosi Kujal, Michelitsch, Smith, & Deng, 
1996; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990, 1991). For example, people often 
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demand considerably more to sell something they have just come to own than they 
would have been willing to pay to acquire it (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002). This 
tendency seems inconsistent with standard economic theory because, absent new 
information or experience, the good itself has not changed in any way that should 
affect valuation. The endowment effect is important in humans because it can 
impede otherwise efficient exchanges of goods, and even tradable rights, thereby 
warping how markets function (Hoffman & Spitzer, 1993; Jones & Brosnan, 2008; 
Korobkin, 2003). The endowment effect is only one of several behaviors that 
human  and  nonhuman  primates  show  that  deviate  from  ‘rational’   in  similar  ways  
[e.g.,   Gambler’s   fallacy,   availability   heuristic   (Tversky   &   Kahneman, 1973), 
overconfidence (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982)]. However, no existing 
theory coherently explains the full suite of irrational behaviors, and only recently 
have evolutionary connections been posited between irrationalities common in 
humans and other species (Brosnan et al., 2007; Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & 
Santos, 2006; Haselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005; 
Jones, 2001). The endowment effect offers the opportunity to test evolutionary 
hypotheses for these irrational behaviors using phylogenetic comparisons between 
related species.  
 Knetsch (1989) was one of the first to identify the endowment effect in 
humans. He presented three groups of undergraduates with coffee mugs and 
chocolate bars. In order to determine the representative ratio of preferences for the 
group as a whole, participants in one group could choose one of the two items 
before completing a questionnaire [condition: choice task]. Participants showed 
approximately equal preference for each object. In another group, participants were 
given the coffee mug before the questionnaire and then offered the opportunity to 
exchange it for a chocolate bar upon completion [condition: endowed with mug]. 
In the final group, the order of the objects was reversed: participants were given 
the chocolate bar prior to the task and then offered the opportunity to exchange for 
a coffee mug after completing the questionnaire [condition: endowed with 
chocolate]. In both of the endowed groups, approximately 90% of participants 
chose to keep the object with which they were endowed, even though presumably 
only half of the group would have preferred that item (based on the preference test) 
if given a choice uninfluenced by ownership. These high refusal rates reflect a 
strong propensity to retain owned goods (i.e., an endowment effect) despite an 
equal distribution of preferences for the two objects in the choice condition.  
The effect has since been demonstrated in many different situations, 
including some using cash values (for details see Jones & Brosnan, 2008). But 
what causes the effect remains a subject of debate. Although various theories have 
been proposed [such as loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991) prospect 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), procedural artifacts (Plott & Zeiler, 2005, 
2007)], these theories fail to provide a stand-alone explanation for the function of 
the behavior (Brosnan et al., 2007; Jones & Brosnan, 2008). For instance, while 
the endowment effect is undoubtedly linked to loss aversion, this raises the 
question of why humans are more averse to losing a thing than they are to losing 
the opportunity to gain the identical thing. In an effort to link disparate but 
patterned   cognitive   irrationalities,   Jones   proposed   the   ‘time-shifted   rationality’  
hypothesis (Jones, 2001) as an explanation of how these behavioral predispositions 
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leading to irrational cognitive biases may have evolved. He posited that many of 
the seemingly irrational, but directionally consistent and wide-spread, biases may 
reflect the disjunction between earlier evolutionary pressures on human cognition 
and the modern environmental features in which human cognitive abilities play 
out. On this view, predispositions toward some behaviors that seem irrational 
today may have evolved as a function of the past benefits that they conferred.    
 With the endowment effect, for example, relinquishing an item in 
exchange for another is riskier than keeping it. There are no guarantees that a 
potential  exchange  partner  will  reciprocate;;  he  may  instead  ‘defect’  upon  gaining  
possession (that is, not provide the object he possesses that was offered in trade). 
The defection of an exchange partner can yield greater losses than would refusing 
to exchange, which at least preserves the item possessed, even if it is of lesser 
value. Modern human societies have dramatically alleviated  the problem of 
defection from exchange interactions through legal and policing systems. Yet the 
asymmetric risks of exchange likely posed far greater problems for our ancestors, 
and continue to do so in species that lack (among other things) the ability to use 
language to mediate interactions and garner support following a defection 
(Brosnan, Grady, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Beran, 2008). 
 To test this hypothesis, Brosnan et al. (2007) investigated the presence of 
the endowment effect in chimpanzees under a series of conditions designed to 
replicate the choice study by Knetsch (1989). Moreover, they supplemented 
between-group analyses of group means (enabling comparisons of endowment 
effect magnitudes among groups, the procedure that is used in human studies) with 
a within-subjects design that better examined possession tendencies in individuals. 
Chimpanzees were presented with a series of choices within pairs of foods and 
pairs of non-food objects. As with the human study, these included a choice 
condition to establish preferences (between two foods in the one case, and between 
two non-food objects in the other) and two endowment conditions.  
 The results provided three key findings. First, they provided the first 
experimental evidence of an endowment effect in a nonhuman species. 
Chimpanzees as a group were 15-20% (depending on the item) more likely to keep 
the food with which they had been endowed than would otherwise be expected on 
the basis of their group-wide preferences. Second, the prevalence of the effect 
across individuals was greater for food than non-food items. Specifically, while 
only 3% of individuals exhibited an endowment effect in the non-food condition, 
42% exhibited it in the food condition. Third, the direction of the effect reversed 
between food and non-food items. Specifically, foods increased the likelihood of 
refusals to exchange by 15-20% (over expected exchanges on the basis of group-
wide preferences). In contrast, the non-food items decreased the likelihood of 
refusals to exchange by 16-58%. Thus,   the   chimpanzees’   maintenance   of   a  
lesspreferred item indicates an even stronger endowment effect than would be 
anticipated if the items were equally preferred by the subjects. 
 Based on these data, and other recent studies finding evidence of an 
endowment effect (Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2008) and loss aversion 
(Chen et al., 2006) in capuchin monkeys, and the endowment effect in some of the 
other apes (Kanngiesser, Santos, Hood, & Call, 2011), evidence is emerging 
supporting this behavior as a trait in common among primates. However, one 
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critical component is missing; it is unclear whether the presence of this behavior 
represents a homology among primates, or a convergence in these species based on 
some characteristics, such as sociality. Sociality may be important if exchange 
behavior only emerges in the context of a multitude of rich social interactions. In 
the present study, we replicate the chimpanzee study in a less gregarious great ape, 
the orangutan. The orangutan is of particular interest with respect to the 
endowment effect because it is closely related to the African apes (which include 
humans), but has a relatively more solitary social organization. Orangutans do 
maintain some social bonds (van Schaik & van Hooff, 1996), and males form 
dominance hierarchies with those males in adjacent territories (van Schaik, 
Preuschoft, & Watts, 2004). Nonetheless, individuals spend a much larger 
percentage of their time either alone or in mother/offspring pairs, and apparently 
lack many behaviors that may be related to solidifying social bonds, such as 
coalitions, cooperative hunting, food sharing and frequent allogrooming (Singleton 
& van Schaik, 2002; van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 2009; van Schaik, Marshall, & 
Wich, 2009; although mother-infant food sharing remains common, Jaeggi, van 
Noordwijk, & van Schaik, 2008). Orangutans typically range either solitarily or as 
an adult female/offspring pair, or, at a few sites, in small groups (average 2.3 
individuals; van Schaik, 1999, 2002), although it is possible that this less socially-
dependent lifestyle is the result of recent selective pressures based on habitat loss 
and destruction, the current pattern of sociality is different from that of the other 
apes.  
Thus, knowing whether the orangutan exhibits an endowment effect 
similar to that seen in other primates will provide much needed information on the 
possible factors influencing its evolution. One previous study examined the 
endowment effect in orangutans, however each of the three orangutans in that 
experiment showed such a strong preference for one food item (pellets) that they 
always traded to acquire them, making it impossible to tell whether they showed 
the effect (Kanngiesser et al., 2011; five orangutans tested with non-foods 
preferred to trade every item they received). For this study, we replicated the 
earlier chimpanzee study (Brosnan et al., 2007) in seven socially living orangutans 
to address this issue. We specifically chose to utilize socially-housed orangutans 
as, despite the possibility that experience in these relatively larger groups could 
have changed their behavior, we could rule out the possibility that a relatively less 
social experimental environment as compared to the chimpanzees caused a 
difference in behavior between the two ape species. If rich sociality is critical to 
the development of endowment effect behavior, these apes may behave differently 
from the relatively more gregarious chimpanzees and humans. However, if the 
endowment effect is the result of homology within the apes, or more broadly all 
primates, we expect the orangutans to behave similarly to the chimpanzees and/or 
capuchin monkeys.  
 





 Subjects were 7 adult orangutans (3 male; 4 female) from 3 different indoor/outdoor social 
groups housed at Zoo Atlanta, Atlanta, GA USA. The use of socially housed individuals meant that 
any differences in behavior were due to species differences, and not any effects of previous lack of 
social interaction on some individuals. Although this different experience could have changed their 
behavior,  we  could  also  rule  out  that  different  housing  conditions  affected  the  orangutans’  results  as  
compared to the chimpanzees. All animals were familiar with general exchange procedures prior to 
testing, and had participated in one previous exchange task study (Brosnan et al., 2012. All animals 
had exchanged both non-food objects and foods as part of regular interaction with keepers. Thus, all 
animals were both comfortable with exchange and were unlikely to anticipate that exchange was 
either mandatory or always profitable, since trading history was not consistently associated with 
reward. Participation was voluntary; subjects were called to the front of their home enclosure and 
given the opportunity to participate. In rare cases in which subjects chose not to participate, sessions 
for those animals were postponed until the following day. During testing, animals were separated 
from the other apes into an area of their indoor environment to minimize distractions. Each session 
took approximately 5 minutes and each ape completed only one test session per day. Animals were 
fed their full diet as normal throughout the study. Testing was done prior to morning feedings to 




 Only food items that were easily passed through caging and were difficult to consume 
rapidly were chosen. These foods were peanut butter and sugar-free fruit flavored popsicles, both of 
which were familiar foods to the orangutans. Peanut butter (PB) was placed inside a 6-in length PVC 
tube along with a small stick for extraction. All subjects were already familiar with obtaining PB in 
this manner. Likewise, the chosen non-food items were small enough to fit through caging and made 
of materials that were similar to those used for routine enrichment, again to minimize effects due to 
novelty. The non-food  items  were  a  rope  toy  and  a  rubber  toy  (a  “Kong”  dog  chew  toy). All apes in 
the study were familiar with these toys, as these are common enrichment items with which they 




 Each subject initially completed a series of six different sessions across two 
treatments, the food treatment (three sessions) and the non-food treatment (three sessions). No subject 
ever received more than one session per day. Sessions occurred approximately every other day for the 
duration of the study. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to complete food sessions first and 
the other half to complete non-food sessions first. Within each treatment (food or non-food) subjects 
completed three sessions in an order that was counterbalanced across subjects.  
Preference sessions. To determine baseline preferences within each pair (food and non-
food, respectively) 16 forced-choice trials were administered for each subject. For this test, the 
experimenter offered both objects (one in each hand approximately 30 cm apart) approximately 30 
cm in front of mesh caging directly in front of the orangutan. The side (left or right) on which the 
object was offered was counterbalanced between subjects. When a subject gestured at the object, it 
was  given  to  the  subject  and  the  other  object  was  removed  and  placed  out  of  sight  on  the  researcher’s  
preparation station. In the case of food objects, all subjects typically consumed all of the food in 
approximately 2 min. In the case of the non-food toy objects, the subjects were allowed to play with 
and inspect the object for 2-3 min, after which the experimenter requested that it be returned. No food 
was ever used to solicit the non-food objects or the PVC tubes that contained the PB, to avoid the 
possibility that subjects would associate the objects with food. When subjects chose not to return the 
non-food object, they were allowed to keep it until a keeper could obtain it at a later point. 
Endowment Sessions. The goal of the Endowment sessions was to see if the subject would 
exchange one object for the other. To accomplish this, in two separate sessions (on different days) the 
subjects were given one of the objects, then allowed to trade for the other. Each subject was given 
each object as the endowment only once (one trial per food and non-food object each), and the order 
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in which foods/objects were presented as the endowed object was randomized and counterbalanced 
amongst subjects. 
For these two sessions, each part of the endowment condition, subjects were initially shown 
both objects by the experimenter, to make sure that the subjects were aware of their options. 
Following this, the experimenter passed only one object through the caging to the orangutan. 
Importantly, the objects were initially shown from a distance, with one being passed to the subject 
before any gesturing could occur. Immediately upon receipt of the endowed object (i.e., when the 
object  was  first  in  the  ape’s  hand),  the  experimenter  held  up  the  other  object  and  offered  to  exchange  
it.  No  vocal  commands  were  used,  to  avoid  cuing  the  apes.  However  the  familiar  ‘exchange  gesture’  
of an outstretched hand was used so that the subjects were aware that exchange was an option. 
Subjects had to return the first item to the experimenter within 60 s to obtain the other. In the case of 
foods, subjects were allowed a single lick or bite to verify which food was being offered, but if more 
than this was taken, the second food item was removed and no exchange was possible. Each of the 
two endowment conditions for each treatment (food and non-food) were counterbalanced with the 




 After completing these six sessions, all orangutans completed a series of control tests. 
These control sessions were done following the test sessions, rather than interspersed, to avoid the 
possibility that the subjects would become sated with a food item or would become bored with a non-
food item. Either of these outcomes would have affected results in the test sessions.   
 The first control was designed to verify that food preferences between the PB and the 
popsicle were stable in these orangutans. This was done with a series of four separate sessions (e.g., 
done on different days), each including four forced-choice trials (16 trials total) in which subjects had 
to choose between the PB and the popsicle. The side on which each food was presented was 
alternated between trials, to control for possible side biases.  
 The second control was designed to determine the degree to which exchanges that occurred 
were due to the orangutans simply enjoying interacting with the experimenter. For instance, there 
could arise a preference for exchange across all conditions simply because the act of exchange was a 
rewarding engagement for the subjects. For this control, each subject was given a single session of 
four trials. For each trial, each subject received one of the items, followed by the opportunity to 
exchange for an identical item.  
 Finally, to verify that the subjects were willing to give up a food in return for another food 
in at least some situations, subjects completed a final control test in which they could exchange for a 
highly valued food. Subjects were initially given a popsicle (the same kind as in the study) and then 
allowed to exchange it for a whole banana. While bananas are of similar shape and size to both the 
popsicles and peanut butter tubes, they are a highly preferred food (creating a sharp asymmetry in 
value, which is known to overcome the typical endowment effect in humans). Subjects had up to 5 




 All statistics were carried out using non-parametric statistics (e.g., chi-squared tests) due to 




Endowment Effect Magnitude 
 
 We   first   investigated   the   orangutan’s   behavior   at   the   group   level,   to  
investigate the magnitude of the response. First considering the food treatment, 
only 43% of the orangutans preferred the popsicle to PB, yet when endowed with 
the popsicle, 100% of subjects chose to keep the popsicle, rather than to exchange 
it for PB, even though PB was the more preferred food. Thus, as a group subjects 
were approximately 60% more likely to keep the popsicle than would be expected 
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based on initial preferences (Figure 1: Z = 2.00, p = 0.046). With PB, the pattern 
was the same, but the effect was not significant (Z = 0.577, p = 0.564). However in 
both of these cases, the group preference between food items is approximately 
50% (chance), whereas the tendency to maintain the food item with which the ape 
had been endowed was between 70% and 100%, or above chance (combining the 
two conditions: Z = 2.41, p = 0.013). 
 In the non-food   treatment,   the   orangutans’   exchange   behavior   did   not  
significantly deviate from their previously established preferences in the group-
wise comparisons (see Figure 1: keep rope toy: Z = 1.342, p = 0.180; keep rubber 
toy: Z = 1.00, p = 0.317). Note, however, that the proportion of the group that 
chose to retain possession of a non-food was approximately 50% (4 of 7 
individuals), or chance, in both cases (Z = 0.27, p = 0.790). This is in contrast to 
the food condition, in which the orangutans chose to maintain the object with 




Figure 1. Population-level choices in forced-choice preference tests and endowment-exchange tests. 
Data are presented as ratio + SE. Grey bars represent the percentage of the population that preferred 
the object in the choice condition, and black bars represent the percentage of the population that 
chose to maintain possession of the food or object in the endowment condition when given the 
opportunity to trade for the other food or object. 
 
Endowment Effect Prevalence 
 
  Individual-level analyses enabled assessment of the prevalence of the 
endowment effect (i.e., the percentage of the population that, when given 
opportunities to exchange, keeps both its more-preferred and its less-preferred 
items). In the food treatment, five individuals (71%) kept both their preferred and 
their non-preferred   foods,  where   ‘preferred’  was   determined   by   that   individual’s  
choice in the choice condition. That is, even when endowed with their less-
preferred food and offered an exchange for the food they preferred, these 
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orangutans maintained possession of their less-preferred  food  (Figure  2:  χ2 (3, N = 
7) = 8.429, p = 0.038). One individual behaved strictly in accordance with his 
preferences, maintaining possession of only his preferred food when endowed with 
it, and exchanging his less preferred food when endowed with it. One individual 
behaved in a manner inconsistent with her previously expressed preference, 
keeping only her non-preferred food and exchanging her preferred food. Notably, 
this individual also showed the weakest preference between items in follow-up 
preference testing. No orangutans exchanged both food items. 
 For the non-food items we found no significant differences between the 
four   possible   individual   outcomes   (χ2(3, N = 7) = 1.571, p = 0.667). Only two 
individuals (29%) kept both their preferred and their non-preferred items, 
indicative of an endowment effect. One individual behaved in accordance with his 
preferences, keeping his preferred non-food item and exchanging his least 
preferred. Four individuals (43%) kept their less preferred non-food object but 




Figure 2. Choices of individuals in endowment-exchange tests. Data are presented as ratio + SE. 
Black bars represent food items and grey bars represent non-food  toy  objects.  “Kept  both”  represents  
those individuals who chose to maintain possession of both foods or both non-foods rather than 
exchange;;   “kept   preferred”   indicates   individuals   who   chose   to   maintain   possession   only   of   their  
preferred item, but exchanged for their non-preferred  item;;  “kept non-preferred”  indicates  individuals  
who maintained possession of the item they did not typically prefer, but exchanged for this non-
preferred   item   when   endowed   with   their   preferred   item;;   “always   exchange”   represents   the   one  
individual who chose to exchange for the other item in both situations. 
 
Comparing Food and Non-food Conditions 
 
 As proposed by Brosnan et al. (2007), there are likely differences between 
the willingness to exchange foods and non-foods because of the difference in 
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evolutionary salience between the two classes of objects. To determine if 
orangutans exhibit this behavioral pattern, as chimpanzees do, we compared the 
likelihood of exchange for foods and non-food objects. Individuals were 
significantly more likely to maintain possession of foods (71%), regardless of the 
opportunity to exchange for another food, than they were to maintain the 
possession of non-food objects (29%), when given the opportunity to exchange for 
another non-food item (Figure 2: Z = 2.00, p = 0.046). Only 1 individual was 
equally likely to exchange foods and non-food objects, and no individuals 
exchanged foods more frequently than non-food objects.  
 
Ruling Out Other Possibilities 
 
 Our results would be confounded if the food preferences of individuals 
varied significantly over time. In  that  case,  the  ‘endowment  effect’  could  be  due  to  
changing preferences, rather than to an effect of possession. In our consistency 
controls, 100% of individuals maintained their initial preferences across 16 
additional trials in 4 daily sessions of 4 trials each. As a group, subjects preferred 
the PB to the popsicle 57% of the time in the initial choice session, and the 
preference for PB stayed consistent, at 53%, across all control sessions. Moreover, 
each individual showed the same food preference in control trials as in the initial 
choice session. 
 Our results would also be confounded if exchange were inherently 
rewarding to the orangutans (for example, due to pleasurable interaction with the 
experimenter). To ascertain the level at which exchange was self-rewarding, we 
performed a control task in which orangutans had the option to exchange for 
identical objects. We find that in the food treatment, any rewarding aspects of the 
exchange interaction are overcome by the value of the rewards. No subject ever 
exchanged a food item for the identical food item. In the case of the non-food 
objects, however, exchange was more common. Three of seven subjects exchanged 
the rope for an identical rope and two exchanged the rubber toy for an identical 
toy. Note that these results are similar to the frequency of exchange in the non-
food endowment condition (in which three of the subjects traded away each non-
food item). This may indicate that, in contrast to behavior related to the food items, 
the inherent rewards of exchange were similar in value to the rewards of the non-
food objects. 
 A final control task tested whether orangutans simply maintained 
possession of food items because they were unwilling to give up a valuable food 
item under any circumstance, which would also confound an endowment effect. 
When endowed with a popsicle and offered a banana (a preferred food of 
approximately the same size) to exchange, three orangutans (43%) traded on the 
first trial, with all but one exchanging by the fourth trial (85%). This latter 
individual showed a very strong preference for the popsicle, preferring it to the PB 
in 100% of trials in the consistency controls, so it is possible that in his case the 
banana was simply not valuable enough (or the popsicle was too valuable). These 
results verify that failures to exchange a less preferred food for a more preferred 
food reflect an active choice to maintain possession rather than a passive resistance 
to trade. 
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Discussion 
 
 We find that orangutans exhibit an endowment effect for food items in 
some contexts, frequently choosing to hold on to less-preferred food items rather 
than to exchange them for more-preferred foods. The magnitude and prevalence of 
this effect are generally similar to those that have been seen in other primates, 
indicating that this is a robust behavior within the taxon. The only notable 
difference between the orangutans and the chimpanzees is that the chimpanzees 
prefer to exchange non-food objects more than anticipated based upon their 
preferences,  while  orangutans’  behavior  with  respect  to  non-foods does not deviate 
from predictions based on their preferences. Our results – which provide 
evidence of the endowment effect at both group level and individual levels of 
analysis in the context of food – support the hypothesis that the endowment effect 
may be the result of homology in the primate lineage, rather than a convergence 
due to similarities in social cognition amongst humans, chimpanzees, and capuchin 
monkeys. As discussed in the Introduction, unlike these other primates, orangutans 
do not engage coalitions, cooperative hunting or even highly regular social 
interactions commonly observed in other great apes. Although individuals live in 
overlapping ranges, establish dominance relationships, and may range in small 
groups when food resources permit, orangutans do not show the level of 
dependence on others observed in chimpanzees or capuchins (van Schaik, 
Preuschoft & Watts, 2004). These other species may cooperatively hunt and food 
share, and also rely on each other for territory maintenance, coalitional support, 
and other social activities (Brosnan, Freeman, & de Waal, 2006; de Waal, 1997; 
Fragaszy, Visaberghi, & Fedigan, 2004; Goodall, 1986; McGrew, 1975). If the 
endowment effect were the result of convergence due to sociality, we might expect 
to observe it only in those species with similar levels of sociality and social 
organization. Instead, our observations of the endowment effect in this less 
gregarious ape, as well as these more social species, indicate that the likelihood 
that the behavior is a homology among primate species is high.  
 These data begin to address the open questions surrounding the presence 
of the endowment effect in humans. There are several potential hypotheses for the 
presence of the endowment effect in humans. One of these can be ruled out; given 
that the effect has now been demonstrated in five nonhuman primate species, it is 
unlikely that the effect arises from uniquely human cultural or genetic phenomena. 
Moreover, given the differences between the species in which the effect has been 
demonstrated, it seems most likely to be the result of evolutionary homology.  
 Unfortunately these data are not yet sufficient to distinguish hypotheses 
regarding why the effect evolved (i.e., the ultimate reason). One possibility is that 
the effect is shared across primates as an incidental by-product of some other 
phenomenon. Our existing data cannot resolve this question, although the selective 
benefit that would be required for this hypothesized phenomenon to offset the 
potential cost of the endowment effect as a by-product makes this possibility less 
likely. Another possibility, which we believe more likely, is that the endowment 
effect is an adaptation for reducing potential losses that are accrued in exchanges 
with individuals who may defect. However, this raises the question of why the 
relatively more solitary orangutan (relative to many other primate species, 
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including the other great apes) shares this feature. We see three possibilities. First, 
the endowment effect may have arisen as part of a suite of cognitive processes that 
humans and other social species have secondarily applied to social situations. This 
could be tested by examining the endowment effect in a gregarious species that 
shows fewer cognitive overlaps with primates. Second, this behavior may have 
arisen in the context of social exchange and been maintained in orangutans despite 
a subsequent shift away from sociality, perhaps due to the ongoing presence of 
(albeit limited) food sharing (Jaeggi et al., 2008; van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 
2009). Examining other primate species with different social systems would 
provide evidence for evaluating this hypothesis. Finally, the endowment effect 
could have emerged in a non-social context. Social exchange is not the only 
context in which giving something up is risky; for instance, in foraging decisions, 
an animal may be faced with the option of pursuing a food in the distance when 
currently in the possession of another food, but choosing pursuit may result in no 
food (or a much worse one). Thus extractive foragers, who routinely process their 
foods, may be under selection to maintain the known item rather than pursuing a 
new one. Examining other species with different foraging strategies may help 
further evaluate this possibility. 
 We also find evidence for a future avenue for research in the observed 
variation in the endowment effect. While we find evidence for an endowment 
effect with respect to both magnitude and prevalence in the context of food items, 
the   orangutans’   behavior   does   not   deviate   as  widely   from  expectations   based   on  
their preferences with regard to non-food items (in either magnitude or 
prevalence). Moreover, subjects were more likely to hold on to an item in food 
than non-food contexts. Perhaps, the perceived value of the non-food objects was 
low – too low to garner either an aversion to loss or an expectation of the value of 
the other object being offered. Thus, whether magnitude or prevalence are 
assessed, we find that the endowment effect is stronger in food than non-food 
contexts, meaning that individuals are more likely to exhibit the endowment effect 
when given exchange opportunities that involve what are presumably more 
evolutionarily salient items. This, too, is the same as was seen with chimpanzees 
(Brosnan et al., 2007). Future studies might further address this hypothesis through 
an examination of exchanges with a wider variety of both food and non-food 
objects (c.f. Brosnan, Jones, Gardner, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2012), in order to 
determine if this is an artifact of the salience of these items to the apes or a 
phenomenon which deserves additional attention.  
 One potential limitation of our study is the relatively small sample size. 
Although previous studies on primates, including some on the endowment effect, 
have used even smaller samples [e.g., n = 5 (Chen et al., 2006)], the study on 
chimpanzees included 33 individuals. The smaller sample means that random 
fluctuations are more likely to cause variations in the results. For instance, the 
group preference for one toy was much higher than chance, which may reflect 
random skew. Importantly, however, our group-level analyses reveal consistencies 
with both the human and nonhuman primate literature (Brosnan et al., 2007; Chen 
et al., 2006; Jones & Brosnan, 2008; Knetsch, 1989). Unfortunately, we know of 
no studies that analyze human behavior at the individual level. Given the variation 
in the nonhuman primate data, we think that this is an avenue that needs to be 
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pursued. Nonetheless, our findings with respect to food items are consistent, both 
within the study and across other studies, indicating that despite the small sample 
our results are valid. We also note that, in contrast to wild-living orangutans, who 
typically live either alone, in mother-offspring pairs or, more rarely, in small 
groups, our orangutans were housed in social situations. This may mean that the 
observed endowment effect is an artifact of ontogeny, rather than evolutionary 
history. However, our choice to use socially housed animals as this also ruled out 
the possibility that any differences between the chimpanzees and orangutans were 
due to the differences in social housing in the test populations, rather than 
differences  in  the  species’  propensities.  
We find that orangutans, like other primates studied thus far, exhibit 
endowment effects in some food contexts, preferring not to give up foods that are 
in their possession in exchange for foods they prefer. Given the presence of this 
phenomenon in other primates with contrasting social structures, the endowment 
effect is likely a homology within the primate lineage. Future studies should 
address additional species, both to see if this phenomenon is common outside of 
the primates and to further test the hypothesis that the behavior varies as a function 
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